Roadmap of Tibetan Independence by Lixiong, Wang
 China Perspectives 
2009/3 | 2009
The Deadlock in Tibet
Roadmap of Tibetan Independence
Wang Lixiong
Édition électronique
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/4850
DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.4850
ISSN : 1996-4617
Éditeur
Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Édition imprimée
Date de publication : 1 septembre 2009
ISSN : 2070-3449
 
Référence électronique
Wang Lixiong, « Roadmap of Tibetan Independence », China Perspectives [En ligne], 2009/3 | 2009, mis
en ligne le 01 septembre 2012, consulté le 28 octobre 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
chinaperspectives/4850  ; DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.4850 
© All rights reserved
74 N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
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T he  M ar ch Inci dent  in  T ib et  isa  Wa te rshe d ( a sum m ar y)
Wang Lixiong contends that after the March 2008incidents, the possibility of Tibetan independ-ence has come under serious consideration by
people such as himself and a section of international
observers. Wang’s thesis is that Tibetan independence has
become an emerging issue thanks to the “anti-secession”
organs in China’s bureaucracy. In fact, Wang says, it is in the
interests of these institutions and their personnel to stoke
and exaggerate fears of separatist problems in China, there-
by conferring on themselves greater decision-making power
in the state machinery, matched by means of action and
intervention. During times of heightened tension, the
bureaucrats in charge of “anti-secession” work command a
decision-making power even greater than that of the central
government and its leaders. The harsh measures adopted by
these bureaucrats to deal with a given crisis lead to a gener-
al hardening of positions, provoking the introduction of even
harsher measures, which in turn produce more violent reac-
tions. According to Wang, the bureaucrats vested with “anti-
secession” responsibilities knowingly let this process contin-
ue in order to keep crises smouldering. In this way they are
able to consolidate their perceived indispensability to the
state machinery, their decision-making power and influence,
and their economic interests as well. The new characteristic
of the bureaucrats’ action during the 2008 uprising, Wang
says, was the ethnic and racial twist they gave the Tibet
issue, inciting a large section of Han Chinese around the
world to spew hatred towards Tibetans and line up behind
the government’s policies. (Lara Maconi, translated by N.
Jayaram)T he  di ff i cult i es  o f a n i mp er ia ls yste m  o f gov er nm ent
“ An ti -s epar ati sm”  as  a pr of ess ion  
The most important function of an imperial state is to keep
the empire’s territory intact. As a result, the anti-separatism
institutions established for this purpose hold a privileged
position in the State. Phuntsog Wanggyal, founder of the
Roadmap of Tibetan
Independence
WA N G  L I X I O N G
1. “Xizang duli luxiantu.” The Chinese original can be found on Wang Lixiong’s weblog,
Wang Lixiong wenku, URL: http://wlx.sowiki.net//. The specific URL for the article is
http://wlx.sowiki.net/?action=show&id=321.
2. An English translation of the first part of “Roadmap of Tibetan Independence“ by Kong
Lingxi can be found at  http://wlx.sowiki.net//?action=show&id=322.
3. www.tibetinfonet.net, News Digest, 6 June 2009 – 19 June 2009. TibetInfoNet also
reported the visit to Dharamsala of a group of Chinese writers invited by the Association
of Tibetan writers, who met the Dalai Lama.
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Wang Lixiong published his “Roadmap of Tibetan Independence“ on the Internet in November 2008, after a relative
easing of tensions following the spring uprising and just after the conclusion of the Beijing Olympic Games. (1) It offers
his interpretation of the Tibet issue with a novel analytical approach that he formulated after the Tibetan protests.
His original view of the Tibet crisis takes into account its deeper causes and charts a path towards Tibetan
independence. “Roadmap“ consists of three parts: 1) The March Incident in Tibet is a Watershed, 2) The difficulties
of an imperial system of government, and 3) The Road to Tibetan Independence. The first part has been translated
into English by Kong Lingxi and disseminated widely on the Internet. (2) It therefore seemed important to publish the
second part, which is more relevant to understanding the author’s views as it contains a detailed analysis of the
nature of bureaucratic institutions and details the system’s failings. In order to give a general idea of what Wang’s
text has to say, a summary of the first part precedes the translation. The third part, not translated here, presents
Wang’s vision of different scenarios for achieving independence, which he believes can only come about through
massive violence and bloodshed. TibetInfoNet reported on 13 June 2009 that Wang was in Dharamsala for a two-
month visit organised by the Association of Tibetan writers. (3) (Lara Maconi, translated by N. Jayaram)
Roadmap of Tibetan Independence 
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Sincere and wide-ranging interest in Tibet onthe part of a segment of the Chinese popula-tion is much more recent than that of West-
erners regarding the Roof of the World. Until the
late 1980s, Chinese writings on Tibet were rare,
apart from those published by the propaganda appa-
ratus. But times have changed. Since Ma Ying-
jeou’s election as President of Taiwan and the
Kuomintang’s return to power, the situation across
the Taiwan Strait no longer seems to be an unsolv-
able issue standing in the way of national unity.
Suddenly, the Tibet issue looms disproportionately
large, obliging people engaged with Chinese politics
as well as strategists of the democratic movement in
exile to take a much clearer stand than before and
to join, or disassociate from, the issue’s rare pio-
neers from the 1970s.
One of the first Chinese dissidents to broach the
Tibet issue was Wei Jingsheng. Even his initial writ-
ings during the Beijing Spring of 1978-1979 ex-
pounded on the fate of Tibetan political prisoners
who had been placed in the Qincheng jail on Mao
Zedong’s order in the 1960s and 1970s. During his
own 18-year-long-incarceration for thought crime,
Wei addressed long missives to Deng Xiaoping set-
ting out his vision of Sino-Tibetan relations and
making suggestions on the attitude to take regarding
Tibet. During his brief spell of freedom between
September 1993 and March 1994, he managed to
send a message by courier to the Dalai Lama in
India, pledging unwavering friendship and express-
ing a long-held desire to meet him. This was re-
alised in 1998, some months after Wei’s expulsion
to the United States. The two men have since ex-
changed ideas during many random international
gatherings.
Another noted dissident, Liu Xiaobo, dared address
an open letter in 1996 calling on then President and
Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin to change his
policy on Tibet and advocating a new alliance be-
tween the Communist Party and the Kuomintang.
This audacity earned him three years of re-educa-
tion through labour. In an article published just be-
fore his most recent arrest in December 2008, Liu
said China would not be democratic so long as
Tibet was denied freedom.
Adoption of such public stances has, however, re-
mained extremely rare both within and outside
China. After 1989 and the exit westwards of many
intellectuals, meetings between leading figures such
as Chen Yizi, Cai Chongguo, and Wan Runnan and
the Dalai Lama took place more frequently than be-
fore. Convinced that China’s democratisation was
imminent, the political exiles addressed Tibetans as
if they would solve the “Tibet problem” as soon as
they ascended to power, but they often did so with
a degree of condescension, not suspecting that the
Tibetans could be planning to demand self-determi-
nation or worse, independence.
Some rare and original dissidents such as Tang Bo-
qiao, who took refuge in France and then the
United States, or Moli in Sweden, took up Tibet’s
cause and sought to champion the Tibetan view-
point to their Chinese readers. They were soon dis-
paraged or worse, ignored — such is the conviction
among most Chinese people that Tibet belongs to
China. 
Within China, the most devoted defender of Ti-
betan culture is the writer Wang Lixiong, who first
travelled to Tibet in 1984 and returned there be-
tween 1995 and 1998 to write a book entitled Tian-
zang (Sky Burial: The Fate of Tibet). After visiting
India and holding long talks with the Tibetan spiri-
tual leader, Wang published Yu Dalailama Duihua
(Discussions with the Dalai Lama) in 2002. The
following year he signed a petition along with 24
other Chinese intellectuals demanding that inde-
pendent lawyers be present during the trial of Ten-
zin Delek Rinpoche, who was accused of complicity
Chinese Intellectuals and the Tibet Issue Marie Holzman
1. Gongmeng or Open Constitution Initiative, Zangqu 3.14 shijian
shehui jingji chengyin diaocha (Research into the Social and
Economic Causes of the March 14th Event in Tibet),
http://www.gongmeng.cn/@admin/upload_files/down/BOZsHov8
9I5454.doc.  
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in a bomb attack in December 2002. Wang holds
that the “middle way” favoured by the Dalai Lama
to resolve the Tibet issue is the only viable solution,
and has urged Chinese authorities to see it as the
basis of future negotiations. He has set out his view-
point at length in an article translated in English
under the title Unlocking Tibet.
Since the March 2008 uprising in Lhasa and the re-
newed repression that engulfed the Tibet Au-
tonomous Region and the Tibetan areas in the
provinces of Sichuan, Qinghai, and Gansu, more
and more Chinese citizens have become concerned
over the situation in Tibet and have supported
moves for a rapprochement between China and the
Tibetans in exile in hopes of calming the extreme
tensions growing both within and outside of China.
Yang Jianli, a Fellow at Harvard University, seeks to
promote intercultural and interfaith dialogue
through an organisation he founded called Initiatives
for China. In Washington, Wei Jingsheng, joined by
Vietnamese, Burmese, Tibetan, and Uyghur ac-
tivists, formed an alliance for democracy in Asia in
2007. In Paris, a Sino-Tibetan friendship alliance
was formed on the occasion of the 20th anniversary
of the Tiananmen massacre, with Chinese and Ti-
betans jointly commemorating the victims of the
1989 repression.
More significantly, many lawyers and intellectuals in
China have openly tried to introduce concepts of
rights and historical and sociological reflection into
discussions aimed at calming tensions in the Tibetan
regions. Right from the spring of 2008, members of
a research organization named Beijing Gongmeng
Consulting Co., Ltd., or Open Constitution Initia-
tive, (1) published a long study on the social and eco-
nomic causes of the 14 March 2008 events in Ti-
betan areas. The authors – Fang Kun, Li Xiang,
Huang Li, and Wang Hongzhe – underline the loss
of real autonomy in the border regions of China and
link social violence to the economic situation in
Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, characterised
by joblessness, poverty, and a lack of basic services
and investment in the education of non-Han ethnic
groups. They point to the Chinese government’s
commitments on regional autonomy spelled out in
the Constitution.
Further, intellectuals from diverse backgrounds, in-
cluding Wang Lixiong, Liu Xiaobo, writer Yu Jie,
professor Ding Zilin, whose son died during the
Tiananmen incident, and a few others joined to cir-
culate a petition entitled “Twelve Suggestions for
Dealing with the Tibetan Situation,” which called
for an end to censorship of reporting on repression
in the Tibetan zones. In addition, 21 lawyers, in-
cluding Teng Biao, Xu Zhiyong, Jiang Tianyong,
and Li Fangping, offered their services to Tibetans
brought before the Chinese courts. The zeal of this
initiative contributed to an official crackdown in
which some 20 lawyers lost their licence to practice
on 1 June 2009, but Li Fangping nevertheless suc-
ceeded in obtaining the release of a monk, Phurbu
Rinpoche, falsely accused of a terrorist act in April
2009. According to Li, it was the first time a Chi-
nese lawyer had acted on behalf of a Tibetan.
It is reassuring that more and more voices are being
raised to ensure that the Tibet issue does not go the
way of the “Chechen   problem,” with violence be-
coming the only tool for dealing with the a forced
coexistence. •
• Translated by N. Jayaram
Chinese Intellectuals and the Tibet Issue
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Tibetan Communist Party and formerly a high official in the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), described the bureau-
crats that populate these institutions as utilising this per-
ceived necessity of “anti-separatism” to make a living, estab-
lish their careers, and make their fortunes. This is because
the greater the problem posed by separatism, the more
power and resources these institutions and bureaucrats are
awarded by the empire. At a fundamental level, this has cre-
ated the instinctive hope among these bureaucrats that sep-
aratism will exist permanently as an issue. Given that at both
the institutional and personal levels it is in their interest for
the nationality issue to remain unresolved, they deliberately
exacerbate existing conflicts and overstate the dangers of
separatism. They cast incidents in the most serious light pos-
sible, exaggerate situations and make them appear much
more acute than they really are, and create issues when
there are none. In order to emphasise their political accom-
plishments, they sometimes take excessively hard-line
approaches in dealing with these events, escalating conflicts
to a higher level. When mistakes are made, they refuse to
admit responsibility, shifting it instead onto others or using
bigger mistakes to conceal smaller ones. 
This flawed management style is sometimes attributed to the
stupidity of executive officials. This is certainly inaccurate,
as officials are not lacking in intelligence. They may be
aware that their behaviour will harm society, but they con-
tinue to carry on in this way because their aim is not to
resolve the underlying issues but to benefit personally from
their management. Take, for example, the Chinese diplo-
mats stationed in foreign countries, many of whom are edu-
cated in the West and spend much time living abroad. When
they organise patriotic demonstrations of overseas Chinese
residents and students, they know that these events will
repulse the people and the media of their host country,
thereby hurting China’s image abroad. But their career in
the bureaucracy doesn’t depend on the host country’s favour
or disgust but rather on satisfying China’s leaders and their
institutions. Chinese leaders feel pride when they see
images of their national flag and patriotic Chinese out in
Western countries in full force, and the diplomats are then
more likely to be promoted. This is their motivation. As far
as damaging the country goes, this is not their responsibility
and they will not be required to shoulder any blame, so they
have nothing to worry about.
I discussed earlier how the bureaucratic clique concerned
with Tibet have placed all blame on the Dalai clique, since
this is the best way for them to avoid responsibility. But this
doesn’t apply to the Ministry of Public Security, the
Ministry of State Security and the People’s Armed Police.
Their functions are to prevent sabotage by “hostile” or over-
seas forces, and because the March Incident — “organized,
premeditated, and carefully planned by the Dalai Clique” —
was successful, these institutions should have to take full
responsibility. Why do they allow a narrative of sabotage to
circulate, one that casts them in a bad light? At the same
time, this also shows the complexity of the bureaucracy: the
most basic instinct of the individual official is to shift respon-
sibility, but a more skilful approach is to turn crisis into
opportunity. The agencies concerned with security did not
therefore blame themselves, instead claiming that they were
crippled by “external factors” such as lack of resources,
insufficient budget, excessive restrictions on their power, and
mild policies. When they violently shut down the Tibetan
protests, they were immediately seen as heroes in the “strug-
gle against the enemy.” Not only were they free from blame,
they were actively praised as well. At the same time, it
demonstrates to the public once again that ruthless crack-
downs are the only efficient method available. Having shut
down the protests, they reflect on the previous approaches
they took—lack of resources, excessive restrictions on power,
mild policies—and draw lessons about their effectiveness. In
this way, they are able to request more resources and power
from higher authorities to implement their hard-line policies
and raise their own status. Such tactics are certainly effec-
tive—for enhancing the careers of the bureaucrats. By taking
advantage of their information monopoly to overstate the
brutality of events and the dangers of separatism, they can
easily frighten the highest authorities within the empire. The
imperial rulers, in turn, are always willing to pay the neces-
sary price to maintain the integrity of territory.
The events that occurred in Tibet in the spring of 2008 are
likely to interrupt the process of liberalisation in the Chinese
state. Reform efforts already underway that were meant to
ease police measures may also now be aborted. This is par-
ticularly true in regions with large populations of ethnic
minorities: milder policies implemented before are now
being revoked, while oppressive powers that were beginning
to be dissipated are now being consolidated once more. In
the name of anti-separatism and counter-terrorism, China’s
minority regions will inevitably be governed under authori-
tarian police states. This is in large part a result of “anti-sep-
Wang Lixiong and the Dalai Lama 
in Dharamsala, June 2009. 
© Wang Lixiong
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aratism” becoming the professional pursuit of a bureaucratic
clique. For despite the larger system in which they find
themselves, bureaucrats will always pursue their own inter-
ests—which should surprise no one. The bureaucratic-author-
itarian system enables clever bureaucrats to harm the nation
and regime for their own professional enhancement, which
is why it contains the seeds of its own collapse.
Th e democ r atic  ch a ra cter  of  b ur eau c ra ticcl iqu es
It may seem strange that, although decisions in authoritarian
regimes are made from top-down, the high authorities turn a
blind eye when their subordinates behave in damaging ways
in pursuit of their personal or institutional interests. Why do
they not intervene? Even if dictators were shielded by false
information in other historical cases, I do not think this is the
case here. Instead, the nature of China’s power structure is
such that the high authorities have no way to override the sit-
uations created by their subordinates, even if they know bet-
ter. This is because, in an authoritarian-bureaucratic system,
the decisions of leaders can only be implemented through
bureaucracy. Because of this, although the highest authori-
ties can exercise absolute authority with regard to external
players, they lack this actual power internally. They are only
able to dictate policy and exercise their authority when it
doesn’t harm the interests of these institutions. Otherwise
the bureaucrats will band together and employ tactics such
as delay, distortion, and non-responsiveness to strip their
leaders of their power in the process of policy implementa-
tion. This process by which the authority of authoritarian
powers is diminished is what I call the democratic character
of bureaucratic cliques [...].
The memory of [the Cultural Revolution] is deeply
engraved upon a bureaucracy that suffered enormously dur-
ing that era. Henceforth, the sentiment has been that no dic-
tators should be allowed to destroy the bureaucratic cliques.
In the post-Mao era, CCP campaigns for Party-building and
developing democracy within the CCP are indeed strength-
ening the democratic character of the bureaucracy and
shielding it from the whims of the authorities. The essence
of this delegation of power—the main component of China’s
reform—is power-sharing among the bureaucratic cliques.
The CCP has to date established a comprehensive system
of internal restrictions, while the bureaucratic cliques have
achieved the capacity to guard against official purges and
block any line struggle that might lead to internal Party divi-
sion. Today, the highest authorities of the CCP are weaker
than at any other time in history. The power transfer has also
been effectively pre-programmed, and the fundamental
cause behind all this is the democratic character of bureau-
cratic cliques.
This is an essential change. In the era of “ideology-above-
all,” power struggles at the highest level were carried out in
the form of line struggle. Bureaucrats could only choose rep-
resentatives along different factional lines and then rise and
fall with their chosen line in a passive way. But when the
CCP transformed from being ideologically-driven to being
merely a power bloc, the bureaucracy—which implements
the power of the regime and benefited most from the shift—
became its core. With the decline of ideology, power strug-
gles within the Party seem ill-founded and lacking in legiti-
macy. As the democratic character of the bureaucracy
grows, inner-Party struggles that harm group interests will be
boycotted by a unified collective of bureaucrats. The CCP
has thus become less divided and more pragmatic. The top
leaders are no longer dictators that lord over the bureaucrat-
ic cliques but are instead their coordinators and spokesper-
sons. At the same time, the leaders can only enhance their
own power by winning the support of the bureaucracy and
maximising their interests.
The bureaucrats understand the machinery of state and can
operate it skilfully, more or less possessing the ability to con-
strain the power of the top leaders, control the appointment
of officials, and decide on the direction of policies. As long
as they retain these capacities, they are not only able to
avoid purges or “cultural revolutions” within the Party, but
can also fend off actions they find unfavourable and increase
their advantage as much as possible. So to view the CCP’s
promotion of inner-party democracy as a step toward the
democratisation of China in general is completely mistaken.
“Inner-party democracy” is just another name for the cen-
turies-old democratic character of bureaucratic cliques. It has
nothing to do with popular democracy. 
Th e T ibet  Is s ue  a t  an  impa ss e
It should be clear through the examination of the democrat-
ic character of bureaucratic cliques and theirs central role in
the CCP why China’s current Tibet policy is not likely to
improve. I mentioned at the beginning that Tibet is governed
by 13 agencies at the provincial or ministerial level, along
with 24 anti-separatism departments at similar levels. The
tactics they employ—deceiving those above, bullying those
below, responding to policies from above with countermea-
sures from below, delaying unfavourable actions indefinite-
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Roadmap of Tibetan Independence 
ly—have been so effective that if even one agency refuses to
implement a certain policy, there is not much the leaders can
do—especially when the 24 departments are in alliance. 
Compared to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the current
CCP leaders enjoy much less authority. They not only lack
expertise, a celebrated history of achievement, and charis-
ma, but they are all also bureaucrats, having been part of the
bureaucracy for years and knowing the rules of officialdom
all too well. Having been promoted, rung by rung, to the top
positions, how could they not know the power of bureaucrat-
ic institutions? Yet because of this, they are not leaders by
nature, but top bureaucrats who are not inclined to look
beyond. They seek simply to remain in power, never daring
to step outside their designated jurisdictions, so we can hard-
ly expect them to show the same level of resolve and inclina-
tion toward change as Mao and Deng. The top CCP lead-
ers did not act in response to the March Incident until long
after it had broken out. Everything was handled by the anti-
separatism agencies. This is a unique feature of the event.
Those 24 departments took control of all the necessary ele-
ments of power, including legislation, military force, and
propaganda. They formed a complete, unbroken chain in
decision-making, implementation, and coordination. Even
without leadership from their leaders, they were able to
coordinate and operate on their own.
The CCP has also fallen into a trap of its own making. Its
metamorphosis from a revolutionary party into merely a
power bloc has left it with sovereignty as its only remaining
substantial ideology—a sovereignty preserved through nation-
alism and making up the core of the CCP’s power. The
state has spared no effort in indoctrinating the people and
continuously rewriting history, so that most Chinese now
believe that China’s imperial territory has belonged to China
since ancient times. Given this narrative, bureaucrats simply
occupy a politically-correct position and therefore easily win
public support. Yet it also means that they would find it dif-
ficult to alter their position or public opinion. Anti-sepa-
ratism can be seen as both a shield and a weapon: it protects
bureaucrats, because none would dare express dissent with
it, but they can also use it to launch an attack against others
at any time. The alliance of the 24 anti-separatist institutions
is extremely powerful—in addition to manifesting the only
substantial ideology of the Party. Mobilizing their “inner-
party democracy,” they are even capable of launching coups
against leaders who disagree with them—all in the name of
protecting national sovereignty, which also presents an easy
avenue for winning support from both the public and mem-
bers of the Party. So in the face of such a threat, China’s
current leaders—for whom power is everything—always tend
toward the official leftist stance in order to avoid attack from
their political opponents and the public, never adopting new
ideas that might threaten their status. Even if they know
with full certainty that maintaining the status quo will guar-
antee a bigger crisis in the future, they will simply postpone
the crisis for as long as possible. With the shift from lifetime
appointments to rotating positions of power, China’s political
system seems headed in a progressive direction. But in fact
it has also caused more damage: those in power strive to
ensure that everything is satisfactory during their term, pre-
ferring to defer trouble to future terms instead. When the cri-
sis breaks out, it will then appear unconnected to earlier
leaders.
In my view, when the international community urges
Chinese leaders to meet with the Dalai Lama; when the
Dalai Lama wishes to communicate directly with Chinese
leaders without using intermediaries; and when members of
the Tibetan elite write letters of petition to the top leaders
of the CCP, they do not really understand the determining
factors within this situation. How to resolve the issue of
Tibet is not something that the leaders of the CCP have the
power to decide on their own. Certainly on some specific
occasions, CCP leaders are able to deal with this issue in
particular ways—but only in strategic ways that don’t affect
the substance of the issue. The tremendous influence and
pervasiveness of anti-separatism forces within China’s power
structure should clearly indicate to us that CCP leaders, no
matter how open-minded, are unable to resolve the Tibet
question. In fact, that is little more than an impractical
dream. •
• Translated by Lingxi Kong and Tianle Chang
• This text is an extract from Wang Lixiong, The Struggle
for Tibet, London, Verso, 2009.
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